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The Death Penalty for Rape
By ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is
true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should
not, therefore, necessarily be confined to the form that evil had
theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach im-
mortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The
future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application
of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a
constitution would indeed be ,as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have
little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and
lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in re-
ality.1
Introduction
In its recent opinion in Coker v. State of Georgia,2 the Supreme Court
held that a sentence of death for the rape of an adult woman is prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment because it constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 3 While serving consecutive life sentences for rape, murder, kidnap-
ping and assault, Erlich Anthony Coker escaped from prison and, during his
flight, entered an unlocked house, robbed the young couple inside, and
raped and kidnapped the wife. He was tried and convicted under a Georgia
statute4 that allowed the imposition of the death penalty when a rape
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. United States Ambassador at Large and formerly United States Representative and
Chairman of United States Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
1. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,373 (1910) (opinion by McKenna, J.) (citations
omitted).
2. 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
3. Id. at 2866.
4. Where, upon a trial by jury, a person is convicted of an offense which may be
punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury verdict
includes a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and a recom-
mendation that such sentence be imposed. Where a statutory aggravating circum-
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conviction was coupled with a conviction for another serious felony, in his
case armed robbery. While Coker was the first case in which the Court held
the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment for a crime other than
murder, 5 to reach that result the Court applied standards that had been
developed long before in Weems v. United States.6 For the first time since
the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court in that case held that a specific
punishment as applied to a specific crime was violative of the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
7
I. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under Weems
In Weems, an officer of the United States Government in the Philip-
pine Islands was convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to
fifteen years of cadena temporal.s Under this ominous sounding punish-
ment of Spanish origin, a prisoner was condemned to hard and painful labor
and forced to wear chains at his ankles and wrists. The penalty of cadena
temporal could also include "civil interdiction," which subjected the
convicted person to a denial of rights of "parental authority, guardianship of
person or property, participation in the family counsel, marital authority, the
administration of property, and the right to dispose of his own property by
acts inter vivos. "9 Finally, after release from prison, the convict was placed
stance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death. When a sentence of death is not recommended by the jury, the
court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment as provided by law. Unless the
jury trying the case makes a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
and recommends the death sentence in its verdict, the court shall not sentence the
defendant to death, provided that no such finding of statutory aggravating circum-
stances shall be necessary in offenses of treason or aircraft hijacking. The provisions
of this section shall not affect a sentence when the case is tried without a jury or when
the judge accepts a plea of guilty.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1977).
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty mav be authorized,
the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise au-
thorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which
may be supported by the evidence:
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1977).
5. 97 S. Ct. at 2866.
6. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
7. Id. at 380-81. Cases before Weems include Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878),
holding that death by firing squad was not cruel and unusual, and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890), holding that death by electrocution, even though "unusual" in that it was a new and
modem method, was still not "cruel" nor forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. See also
Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773,
1777-78 (1970).
8. 217 U.S. at 363-64.
9. Id. at 364.
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under "surveillance" for the duration of his life. 1 After a careful analysis
of the historical experience that formed the basis for the Eighth Amendment,
the Court, in an opinion written by Justice McKenna, examined the penalty
in question against the evil sought to be mitigated and concluded that the
punishment was cruel and unusual."
In so doing, the Weems Court developed three tests to determine the
constitutionality of state imposed punishments: First, given the socially
permissible objectives of punishment, whether deterrence, isolation or re-
habilitation, a given punishment is cruel and unusual if a less severe one can
as effectively achieve the permissible ends. 12 Second, a punishment is cruel
and unusual if the evil it produces is disproportionately higher than the harm
it seeks to prevent. 13 Third, regardless of its effectiveness in achieving the
permissible ends of punishment, a specific punishment is cruel and unusual
if it offends contemporary moral values. 4 This third test acts as a lens
through which the Court must view the other tests for excessive punishment
and disproportionate harm. Applying these tests, the Court found that
viewed through evolving public opinion as "enlightened by a humane
justice,"' 15 fifteen years of hard labor in chains was disproportionate to the
crime of falsification of documents by a minor government official and that
a lesser punishment would equally serve the desired ends. The Court
concluded that by means of punishment less severe than the death penalty,
"[tihe purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of
just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given
for the reformation of the criminal. '16
Since developing the cruel and unusual punishment tests in Weems, the
Supreme Court has invoked the Eighth Amendment's proscription in Trop
v. Dulles,17 holding the imposition of loss of citizenship for a conviction of
war time desertion to be a cruel and unusual punishment, 18 and in Robinson
v. California,19 holding that a California law making it a crime to be a drug
10. Id.
11. Id. at 380-81.
12. Id. at 381. "The State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of
punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its
repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal." Id.
13. Id. at 366-67. "Such [severe] penalties for such offenses amaze those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice
of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Id.
14. Id. at 378. "[The Eighth Amendment] is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 381.
17. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
18. Id. at 99-103.
19. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Winter 19781
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
addict constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.2" In Trop, Chief Justice
Warren relied upon the Weems tests in weighing the punishment against the
"enormity of the crime" 21 in the context of "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." ' 22 In Robinson, Justice
Stewart, delivering the opinion of the Court, noted that a punishment must
be tested against the crime for which it is inflicted, since the excessiveness
of a punishment is what makes it constitutionally impermissible. 23 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas applied the Weems "lesser punish-
ment" test: "A prosecution for addiction, with its resulting stigma and
irreparable damage to the good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a
means of protecting society, where a civil commitment would do as well." 24
Thus, the Weems tests were applied in these two cases shortly before I
joined the Court in 1963.
H. Arguments for Applying Weems to the Death Penalty
As early as the October Term of 1963, I had circulated a memorandum
to the other justices on the Court supporting the idea that the death penalty is
proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. My concern about the death penalty arose from a study of
capital punishment during my years as a practicing attorney and was accen-
tuated during my service on the Court by the number of cases on the
conference list seeking review by certiorari of death penalty sentences. In
the memorandum, I reviewed the history of the death penalty in our country
and made certain observations about its constitutionality.
Research had disclosed that many nations of the western world had
abolished the death penalty,25 and that even where it was not abolished, it
was not generally practiced. 26 Those nations that had abolished the death
penalty rarely, if ever, restored it; the worldwide trend was unmistakably in
the direction of abolition.27 Moreover, even in this country, several states
had abolished the death penalty. 28 Public opinion polls did not show strong
feelings in favor of retaining the death penalty, but there was a close
division among the public on the subject. 29
20. Id. at 667.
21. 356 U.S. at 100.
22. Id. at 101.
23. 370 U.S. at 667.
24. Id. at 677 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
25. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC AFFAIRs, UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 8 (1962). Twenty-nine nations were listed as having abolished capital punishment
completely.
26. Australia, New South Wales and Nicaragua are included within this group. Id. at 8-9.
27. Id. at 7-9.
28. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
29. G. GALLUP, III THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION, 1935-1971, at 1659 (1972); Roper
Polls on Capital Punishment (Aug. 1957 & Feb. 1960).
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In certain matters, especially those relating to fair procedures in crimi-
nal trials, the Supreme Court has led rather than followed public opinion in
the process of articulating and establishing progressively civilized standards
of decency. If only punishments that are overwhelmingly condemned by
public opinion come within the cruel and unusual punishment proscription,
I argued, the Eighth Amendment would be a hollow protection. Such
punishments would presumably be abolished by the legislature or suffer
desuetude. The Eighth Amendment, however, like the other nine in the Bill
of Rights, was intended as a countermajoritarian limitation on government
action; it is to be applied to nurture rather than to retard our "evolving
standards of decency." As the Court recognized in Weems, "our contem-
plation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be." 30
Three factors influenced my 1963 memorandum to the Court: The
finality of death, its failure as a deterrent, and the arbitrary fashion in which
the death penalty was being imposed. 31 The finality of the death penalty was
the foremost factor contributing to my opinion. Whenever capital punish-
ment is imposed, there is always the possibility of mistakenly and irredeem-
ably executing an "innocent" person. Weems recognized that even giving
full weight to reasonable legislative findings, a punishment is nevertheless
cruel and unusual if one less severe can as effectively achieve the permissi-
ble ends of justice. 32 Commentators agreed that deterrence is a principal end
result. The critical question, therefore, was whether capital punishment had
any greater deterrent effect upon potential criminals than did a less severe
punishment, such as life imprisonment. If a less severe punishment would as
effectively deter, it would follow that the death penalty is unconstitutional
under the first Weems test. 33
Voluminous research has been conducted in an effort to learn whether
capital punishment is a unique deterrent to capital crime. The most that can
be said, however, is that "there is no clear evidence in any of the figures
. . . that the abolition of capital punishment has led to an increase in the
homicide rate, or that its reintroduction has led to a fall." ' 34 Whatever
standards are generally applicable to weighing legislative findings based on
conflicting evidence, under prevailing judicial doctrine the state must show
an overriding necessity before it can take human life.35 I concluded in the
30. 217 U.S. at 373.
31. There was disturbing evidence that the imposition of the death penalty had been
arbitrary, haphazard, capricious and discriminatory. For example, the impact of the death
penalty had been demonstrably greatest among disadvantaged minorities.
32. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
33. Id.
34. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT, at 23 (1953).
35. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
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memorandum that because there was no persuasive evidence that capital
punishment uniquely deters capital crime, and because doubts should be
resolved against the death penalty, this penalty runs afoul of the constitu-
tional principles articulated in Weems and is, therefore, unconstitutional per
se.
The Court, however, did not agree that capital punishment, as such,
was unconstitutional. So I submitted for its consideration an alternative
proposition that the infliction of death for certain crimes and in the case of
certain offenders was violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. I
questioned specifically the constitutionality of death as a penalty for crimes
that do not endanger life. This question, which I derived from the second
Weems test, was posed: May human life constitutionally be taken by the
state to protect a value other than human life? According to Weems, a
punishment can create no greater evil than the harm that is sought to be
deterred. 36 Therefore, if the crime did not involve the taking of a human life,
I argued, the punishment cannot be death.
It is apparent from the Court's record that this alternative proposal also
did not prevail. Attesting to this fact is the Court's denial of certiorari in
Rudolph v. Alabama,37 from which I, joined by Justices Douglas and
Brennan, dissented on the ground that the Court should have reviewed the
constitutionality of a death sentence for a conviction of rape:
I would grant certiorari in this case and in. . . Snider v. Cunning-
ham 31 . . . to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution permit the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on a convicted rapist who has neither
taken nor endangered human life.
The following questions, inter alia, seem relevant and worthy
of argument and consideration:
(1) In light of the trend both in this country and throughout
the world against punishing rape by death, does the imposition of
the death penalty by those States which retain it for rape violate
"standards of decency more or less universally accepted"?
(2) Is the taking of human life to protect a value other than
human life consistent with the constitutional proscription against
"punishments which by their excessive. . . severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged"?
(3) Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g., deter-
rence, isolation, rehabilitation) be achieved as effectively by pun-
ishing rape less severely than by death (e.g., by life imprison-
ment); if so, does the imposition of the death penalty for rape
constitute "unnecessary cruelty"? 39
36. See note 13 supra.
37. 375 U.S. 889, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 917 (1963).
38. 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
39. Id. at 889-91 (footnotes omitted).
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Not until the most recent decision, Coker v. Georgia,4° did the Court
confront the issues raised in Rudolph.
HI. Recent Applications of Weems
A. Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,41 in which
three death penalty cases were consolidated on appeal. One petitioner had
been sentenced to death for murder; the other two had been sentenced to
death for rape. 42 After much consideration and by a five to four vote, the
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty in each of the three cases
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 43
Furman is a unique decision, not only on its merits, but also in its
form. Although there was a brief per curiam opinion announcing the
decision, there was no opinion of the Court. Instead, each of the nine
justices expressed his view in a separate opinion. Among the justices of the
majority, Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that capital punishment
was unconstitutional per se under the Eighth Amendment. 44 Justice Douglas
based his vote in support of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty on
the ground that capital punishment, as practiced in recent times, has. dis-
criminated against minorities and, in effect, has violated the concept of
equal protection that he found implicit in the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. 45
A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000
would be exempt from the death penalty would plainly fail, as
would a law that in terms said that blacks, those who never went
beyond the fifth grade in school, those who made less than $3,000
a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the
only people executed. A law which in the overall view reaches that
result in practice has no more sanctity than a law which in terms
provides the same.46
Justices Stewart and White based their conclusions on the arbitrariness
and infrequency with which the death penalty is actually imposed in relation
to those sentenced for capital crimes. 47 As Justice Stewart stated:
40. 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
41. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
42. Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969); Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga.
790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (1969).
43. 408 U.S. at 239-40.
44. Justices Brennan and Marshall relied upon the Weems tests to arrive at their conclu-
sions. 408 U.S. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 330-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 256 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
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These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the
people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, manyjust as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capri-
ciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed. 48
The four dissenters, on the other hand, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Blackmen, Powell and Rehnquist, expressed the view that the death penalty
was constitutional and that its abolition should be left to the legislatures and
not to the courts.
49
The Weems tests were applied in three of the separate opinions.50
Justice Douglas, in defining cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, applied the third Weems test of contemporary moral stan-
dards, as articulated in Trop v. Dulles.51 Changing social values compelled
him to conclude that the unequal application of punishment is cruel and
unusual. 52 Justice Brennan relied upon the first and third Weems tests in
formulating a "cumulative" test for the unconstitutionality of a punishment:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability
that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by
contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it
serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe
punishment, then [its] continued infliction . . . violates the
command [of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments].53
Likewise, Justice Marshall invoked the first Weems test of excessive pun-
ishment 54 and discussed a test similar to the third Weems test of contempo-
rary moral standards. 55 Thus, although Furman was a plurality opinion
based on the discretionary element of the death penalty statutes in ques-
tion, 56 the principles in Weems, nonetheless, played a definitive role in
shaping the opinions of a majority of the members of the Court.
The Court's decision in Furman invalidated some thirty-nine state
statutes, the District of Columbia's death penalty legislation and various
provisions of the United States Criminal Code and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice5 7 because of the discretionary, arbitrary, infrequent and
48. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
330-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
52. 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 331, 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 362.
56. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1005, -1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969);TEX.As
PEN. CODE, art. 1189 (1961).
57. See 408 U.S. at 417-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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discriminatory basis upon which guilty offenders could be sentenced under
those laws. Since Furman, Congress and thirty-five states, including Geor-
gia, have enacted death penalty legislation in conformity with that opinion.
By specifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in
deciding when to impose a capital sentence, and by making the death
penalty mandatory for certain crimes, the new statutes avoid the discretion-
ary, and thus unconstitutional, element of the statute struck down in
Furman.
B. Gregg v. Georgia
In July of 1976, the revised Georgia death penalty statute58 was
scrutinized by the Court in the case of Gregg v. Georgia.59 The decision of
the Court was announced in an opinion by Justices Stewart, Powell and
Stevens, holding that punishment of death for the crime of murder under a
statutory scheme that required the sentencing jury to make specific findings
as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant and
that required the state supreme court to compare each sentence rendered by a
jury to that imposed upon other similarly-situated criminal defendants6O did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 61 Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist, White and Blackmun concurred, 62 while Justices Brennan 63 and
Marshall 64 wrote separate dissenting opinions.
The majority opinion in Gregg dealt with .each of the three Weems
tests in reaching the conclusion that the Georgia statute was not a cruel and
unusual punishment. With regard to the disproportionate harm of the penalty
vis-h-vis the crime, the Court held that a penalty of death for the crime of
murder was not disproportionate. 65 The Court, however, specifically de-
clined to confront the issue not presented by the facts before it, namely,
whether a penalty of death for a crime other than murder would be dispro-
portionate. 66 In considering contemporary moral standards, the Court de-
cided that the legislative changes subsequent to Furman,67 the recent jury
verdicts under the new statutes, 68 and the California death penalty referen-
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975).
59. 428 U.S. 153, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). There were four companion cases
to Gregg: Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
60. 428 U.S. at 164-66. See note 58 supra.
61. Id. at 187-93.
62. There was a separate opinion by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment
based upon his dissent in Furman. Id. at 227.
63. Id. at 227.
64. Id. at 231.
65. Id. at 187 (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 187 n.35.
67. Id. at 179-80.
68. Id. at 182.
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dum6 9 all indicated that public sentiment was in favor of retaining the death
penalty. With these considerations in mind, the Court refused to apply the
first Weems test of excessive punishment on the ground that
"[c]onsiderations of federalism as well as respect for the ability of a
legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular state, the moral consensus
concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to
conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of
death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not
unconstitutionally severe." 70
The two dissenting opinions, by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
focused on the third Weemg test. Justice Brennan suggested that the majori-
ty opinion in analyzing "evolving standards of decency" looked to the state
procedures for applying the penalty rather than the death penalty itself, in
that the majority had arrived at constitutionality not by testing the penalty
but by testing only the sentencing procedures. 71 Justice Marshall based his
dissent upon the excessiveness 72 of the death penalty and upon an interpreta-
tion of the contemporary moral standards test that would look only to a fully
informed citizenry. 73 Relying in part upon a study that indicated that public
opinion seemingly in support of the death penalty altered significantly when
only the opinions of those knowledgeable about the effects and conse-
quences of the penalty were considered, Justice Marshall concluded that
"the American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the death
penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally unaccept-
able. 74
The Gregg decision upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment
for deliberate murder under state statutes that allowed juries and judges to
determine, under prescribed guidelines, whether a defendant should be
sentenced, to death. The constitutionality of the statutes depended upon the
fact that those guidelines permitted admission of evidence demonstrating
aggravating or mitigating circumstances prior to the discretionary determi-
nation. On the same day Gregg was decided, the Court struck down
mandatory death sentences for murder in Roberts v. Louisiana.75 As a result
of Gregg, approximately 300 prisoners in death cells in a number of states
became subject to execution because their sentences were in conformity
with the statutes upheld by the Court. Several have since been executed.
About 300 other prisoners were affected by the ruling in Roberts and have
69. Id. at 181. The referendum effectively negated a prior ruling by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied,
406 U.S. 958 (1972).
70. 428 U.S, at 186-87.
71. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 232.
74. Id.
75. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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since been re-sentenced to life imprisonment or to death under revised
sentencing procedures.
C. Coker v. Georgia
On June 29, 1977, the Court in Coker v. Georgia,76 dealt specifically
with the question left open in Gregg-the constitutionality of the death
penalty as punishment for a crime other than murder. The Court held that a
sentence of death for rape of an adult women constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 77 Once
again, there was no opinion for the Court. Justice White wrote the plurality
opinion in which Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens joined. 78 Justices
Brennan and Marshall each concurred separately in the judgment, adhering
to the view that the death penalty is in all circumstances a cruel and unusual
punishment. 79 The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.80
Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part, his dissent being from
that section of the opinion holding that rape, with or without aggravated
circumstances, cannot constitutionally be punished by death.81 In his view,
capital punishment for rape would be constitutional in situations in which
legislatures have allowed this ultimate penalty for outrageous rape resulting
in serious and lasting harm to the victim.82 Since Coker was not convicted of
such an "outrageous rape," but rather of rape coupled with another felony,
armed robbery, the death penalty was cruel and unusual as applied to him. 83
In his plurality opinion, Justice White relied upon all three Weems
tests. The Court referred to the Gregg opinion for a clarification of the first
two tests:
Under Gregg, a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if
it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail
the test on either ground.84
With respect to the rape of an adult woman, the Court concluded that the
death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment because it is excessive and
disproportionate to the crime of rape.8 5 In addition, the Court in examining
contemporary moral standards found that prevailing public sentiment was
76. 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
77. Id. at 2866.
78. Id. at 2863-70.
79. Id. at 2870.
80. Id. at 2872.
81. Id. at 2870.
82. Id. at 2871-72.
83. Id. at 2870.
84. Id. at 2865 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 2866.
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not in favor of the death penalty for rape; subsequent to Furman, only three
state legislatures included the crime of rape of an adult woman in their
amended death penalty statutes.16 Furthermore, as Justice White noted,
"[a]t no time in the last 50 years has a majority of the States authorized
death as a punishment for rape.''87
In ruling that the death penalty for rape in connection with a felony was
too severe a punishment, Justice White did not overlook the seriousness of
the crime:
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total
contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female
victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom
intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it
is the "ultimate violation of self.". .. Rape is very often accom-
panied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental
and psychological damage.88
Thus, Justice White, relying upon the tests devised in Weems, concluded
that although rape is deserving of serious punishment, the death penalty,
which is unique in its severity and irrevocability, is an excessive penalty for
a convicted rapist. 89
Conclusion
Coker, in part, echoes the same arguments that I expressed in the 1963
Rudolph dissent. I would be less than honest in failing to admit a great
personal gratification in the Court's holding. Joining with Justices Brennan
and Marshall in the belief that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all
circumstances, 9° I regard Coker as a giant step forward after the deplorable
step backward in Gregg. This result is to be welcomed and is worthy of
commendation. To paraphrase Justice McKenna's pertinent observation in
Weems: Time does indeed work changes. 91 In 1963, I was confident that
the views expressed in the Rudolph dissent would ultimately prevail, and
now with equal confidence I voice the belief that Gregg will be ultimately
86. Id. at 2867. Those states were Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana. The North
Carolina statute was invalidated by Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Louisiana's statute was invalidated by Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Also, Florida,
Mississippi and Tennessee permitted the death penalty for rape of a child by an adult. 97 S. Ct.
at 2867 & n.9.
87. Id. at 2866.
88. Id. at 2868 (footnotes omitted) (citing LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRA-
TION REPORT, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975); Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist
View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 338 (1973); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in
Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 922-23 (1973)).
89. Id. at 2869.
90. Id. at 2870. See Justice Brennan's and Justice Marshall's dissents in Gregg, and their
concurring opinions in Furman.
91. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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overruled and the Court will take what Camus called the great civilizing
step of putting an end to the death penalty. 92 At the time that Rudolph came
before the Court, I believed that the death penalty was unconstitutional per
se under the Eighth Amendment. I have not departed from that conviction.
92. See A. CAMUS, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE (R. Howard trans. 1959).

